Small firm credit market discrimination, SBA-guaranteed lending, and local market economic performance by Ben R. Craig et al.
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
06  13
Small Firm Credit Market Discrimina-
tion, SBA-Guaranteed Lending, and 
Local Market Economic Performance
by Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson, III, and 
James B. ThomsonWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials 
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not 
have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland publications. The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
 
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World 
Wide Web: www.clevelandfed.org/research. 
 
 
 Prepared for “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science” Special 
Issue on Minority Entrepreneurship. Ben R. Craig and James B. Thomson are economists in the 
research department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  William E. Jackson, III, is a 
financial economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.  The authors thank Timothy Bates 
and seminar participants at the 2006 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Conference on 
Minority Entrepreneurship for providing helpful comments on this manuscript.  They also thank 
the Small Business Administration for providing the SBA loan-guarantee data, and Patrick 
Higgins for providing outstanding research support.  Additionally, William E. Jackson, III, thanks 
the E. M. Kauffman Foundation for providing financial support for this research project.  
Questions or comments on this paper should be directed to William E. Jackson III at 
william.jackson@atl.frb.org. 





Small Firm Credit Market Discrimination, SBA-Guaranteed Lending, and Local 
Market Economic Performance 
By Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson, III, and James B. Thomson 
 
JEL codes:  G38, H81, J15, O16 
 
Key words:  discrimination, employment rates, small firm credit markets, loan 
guarantees, credit rationing 
 
 
We empirically test whether SBA-guaranteed lending has a greater impact on economic 
performance in markets with a high percentage of potential minority small businesses.  
This hypothesis is predicated on priors related to three overlapping assumptions. These 
three assumptions are:  (1) The classic type of credit rationing developed in the seminal 
paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is more likely to occur in markets with a higher per 
capita percentage of minority small businesses because such markets are more likely to 
have more severe information asymmetry problems, (2) SBA-guaranteed lending is likely 
to reduce these credit rationing problems—thus improving the level of development of 
the local financial market, and (3) increased local financial market development helps to 
lubricate the wheels of economic performance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Using local 
labor market employment rates as our measure of economic performance, we find 
evidence consistent with this proposition.  In particular, we find a positive and significant 
impact on the average annual level of employment in a local market of SBA-guaranteed 
lending in that local market.  This impact is 200 percent larger in markets with a high 
percentage of potential minority small businesses. This result has important implications 
for public policy in general and SBA-guaranteed lending in particular.   3
Small firm credit market discrimination, SBA guaranteed lending, and 
local market economic performance 
 
1.  Introduction 
  Minority entrepreneurs report that access to adequate capital is a major problem 
much more often than their majority counterparts.  For example, in a recent study, 
Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) report that Black small business owners 
are three times as likely as White small business owners to list access to sufficient capital 
at reasonable rates as a major problem faced by their firm. 
  This reported disparity in access to capital between minority and majority small 
business owners may stem from one or two possible sources [or some combination of 
these sources].  Either minority small business owners do not offer to capital providers as 
many positive net present value (NPV) projects, on average, as majority small business 
owners.  Or, minority small business owners are subject to certain constrains on the flow 
of capital to their operations that majority small business owners do not encounter. 
  The former is simply a perception of capital access disparities.  However, the 
latter represents real economic effects that serve to distort capital markets and reduces the 
efficiency of our overall financial system.  Most of the extant literature points to this 
latter description as painting the more accurate picture of the current market conditions 
faced by minority owners of small firms.  For example Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and 
Wolken (2002) report that minority-owned small businesses are not significantly less 
profitable than majority owned small businesses.  Thus, the hypothesis that minority 
small business owners on average have fewer NPV projects is not supported by the data.     4
  What then are the likely sources of capital access constraints on minority small 
businesses?  The extant literature usually points to discrimination as the likely culprit.  
For example, Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) conclude that their analysis 
(which considers a very rich set of explanatory variables) strongly points to severe levels 
of discrimination in small business credit markets. 
  There are at least two reasons why discrimination against minority-owned firms 
might be observed in small business credit markets.  The first is simply prejudicial 
behavior [Becker (1971) type discrimination].  The second is related to differential levels 
of asymmetric information and credit rationing.  If minority-owned firms are more likely 
to be credit rationed because of relatively larger asymmetric information problems, then 
it is possible to observe capital allocation outcomes in the small firm credit market that 
coincide with outcomes based on prejudicial discriminatory behavior.  However, if the 
source of the disparity is credit rationing, then this type of behavior is more accurately 
described as statistical discrimination and does not carry the nefarious connotations 
associated with prejudicial discrimination.  Nevertheless, it is still discrimination and 
more importantly, it places a real cost on our economic system. 
  One method likely to reduce these costs of asymmetric information based 
discrimination is to reduce the amount of asymmetric information in these credit markets 
[especially for minority-owned firms].  One very practical method for doing this is to 
encourage lenders to make [profitable] loans that they would not otherwise make.  And, 
in so doing the lender develops a “relationship” with the borrower.  This relationship 
allows for the collection of borrower-specific information at a relatively low cost through 
basic monitoring of the loan.  This reduces future levels of asymmetric information and   5
reduces observed statistical discrimination by fostering a relationship between the 
minority-owned small business and the lending entity. 
  One program designed to ameliorate the asymmetric information problem in small 
business credit markets is the SBA guaranteed lending program.  There is some evidence 
that this program helps to reduce credit rationing problems in small firm credit markets 
[Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2006].  Because the financial contracting problems that 
lead to credit rationing are basically the same types of problems that lead to statistical 
discrimination, it is reasonable to investigate whether a government intervention that 
reduces credit rationing also reduces observed disparate treatment or observed 
discrimination.   
  Thus, the primary research question addressed in this paper is:  Does SBA 
guaranteed lending lessen the negative impacts of discrimination on minority 
entrepreneurs and their communities?  The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows.  In section 2 we provide some background on economic performance and 
financial market development.  In section 3 we present a discussion of public policy and 
small business credit markets.  In section 4 we provide a brief review of the academic 
literature on credit rationing and relationship lending.  This literature is consistent with 
the hypothesis that information problems in lending markets are particularly severe in the 
small firm credit market and hence provides a rationale for SBA loan guarantees.  An 
overview of SBA lending programs is presented in section 5.  Section 6 outlines the data, 
our hypotheses and empirical strategy.  The results appear in section 7.  Finally, our 
conclusions and future research questions are outlined in section 8. 
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2.  Background on economic performance and financial market development 
  It is a well documented finding in the economics literature that economic growth 
and financial market development tend to be positively correlated.  However, whether 
relatively higher levels of financial development actually cause higher levels of economic 
performance, or higher levels of economic performance cause higher levels of financial 
development, is an issue of debate that dates at least to the studies of Schumpeter (1911) 
and Robinson (1952).     
  Three important recent studies provide evidence that relatively higher levels of 
financial market development do indeed tend to lead to higher levels of one measure of 
economic performance.  That is, higher rates of economic growth.  Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), all report 
significant evidence supporting the proposition that the causal relationship runs from 
more financial market development to more economic growth.  All of these papers are 
very careful to develop reasonable structural instruments to proxy for the relative amount 
of local financial market development. 
  In this paper, we investigate whether local financial market development helps to 
promote economic performance by focusing on a particular rationale for such a 
relationship.  That rationale is financial market development may increase the amount of 
external finance available to minority-owned small firms.  Specifically, we examine 
whether a government intervention aimed at increasing small firms’ access to bank credit 
has a relatively greater impact in high-minority areas.  We use SBA guaranteed lending 
as our government invention method.  We choose the [minority-owned] small firm credit 
market because of the high degree of information asymmetry that may be associated with   7
it.  And, because this information asymmetry may lead to a credit rationing problem as 
explained in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). This may be especially important in high-
minority areas where the per capita number of minority-owned small businesses is likely 
to be higher. 
  We choose the SBA guaranteed lending program because our previous research 
(Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2006) suggests that SBA guaranteed lending has a small 
positive influence on the rate of economic growth in local geographic markets.  Our 
previous research used MSAs and non-MSA counties to represent local geographic 
financial markets.  However, Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006) did not investigate 
whether a positive relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and other measures of 
economic performance existed.  Nor did we investigate whether these relationships were 
different for areas with a relatively high proportion of minorities in the local market.  We 
refer to these markets as high-minority markets.  And, we use the level of labor market 
employment, or the employment rate, as our measure of economic performance.  Thus, 
we test whether SBA guaranteed lending has a differential impact for high-minority 
markets. 
  In this paper, our null hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending does not impact 
high-minority markets differently than low minority markets.  And, our primary 
alternative hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending has a greater impact on the 
employment rate in high-minority markets.  This alternative hypothesis is predicated on 
priors related to three assumptions.  First, less developed financial markets are more 
likely to experience severe information asymmetry problems, and as Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) point out, that could lead to credit rationing.  Second, SBA guaranteed lending is   8
likely to reduce these credit rationing problems.  This will improve the level of 
development of that local financial market.  And, third, this increased financial market 
development will help to lubricate the wheels of economic performance [especially in 
high-minority markets] and increase the effective level of labor utilization, or the 
employment rate (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
  Our results suggest that high-minority markets are positively impacted by SBA 
guaranteed lending.  Moreover, the impact for high-minority markets is three times as 
large as it is for low minority markets.  This result has important implications for public 
policy in general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular. 
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3.  Public policy and small business credit markets 
The promotion of small businesses is a cornerstone of economic policy for a large 
number of industrialized countries.  Public support for small enterprise appears to be 
based on the widely held perception that the small business sector is an incubator of 
economic growth, a place where innovation takes place and new ideas become 
economically viable business enterprises.  In addition, policymakers routinely point to 
small businesses as important sources of employment growth.  It is not surprising, then, 
that there is widespread political support for government programs, tax breaks, and other 
subsidies aimed at encouraging the growth and development of small business in the 
United States, and increasingly, around the world. 
A particular area of concern for policymakers is whether small businesses have 
access to adequate credit.  After all, a lot of small firms are relatively young and have 
little or no credit history.  Lenders may also be reluctant to fund small firms with new and 
innovative products because of the difficulty associated with evaluating the risk of such 
products.  These difficulties are classic information problems—problems obtaining 
sufficient information about the parties involved in a transaction—and they may prevent 
otherwise creditworthy firms from obtaining credit.  If information problems are 
substantial, they can lead to credit rationing, that is, loans are allocated by some 
mechanism other than price.  If small businesses face credit rationing, the next Google, 
Microsoft, or Starbucks might wither on the vine for want of funding.  To the extent that 
credit rationing significantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale exists for 
supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving small   10
business access to credit. This rationale may be even stronger when applied to high-
minority markets.  
One specific government intervention aimed at improving the private market’s 
allocation of credit to small enterprises is the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
guaranteed lending program.  SBA loan guarantees are well established, and their volume 
has grown over the past decade.  Nearly 20 million small businesses have received direct 
or indirect help from one or another of the SBA’s programs since 1953.  The SBA's 
business loan portfolio of roughly 240,000 loans was worth about $60 billion in 2004, 
making it the largest single financial backer of small businesses in the United States.  To 
place this amount in perspective, consider that in June 2004 commercial banks reported a 
total of about $522 billion dollars of small business loans outstanding (SBA, 2005).  
Thus, SBA guaranteed loans represented over 10% of total commercial bank small 
business loans outstanding at that time.  And, commercial banks provide the majority of 
small business credit supplied in the USA.  
The rationale for SBA guarantees appears to be that credit market imperfections 
can result in small enterprises being credit rationed—particularly for longer-term loans 
for purposes such as capital expansion.  If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit 
rationing in the markets for small business loans, then there should be a relationship 
between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance.  
And, this is what we found in Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006).  In particular, we 
found a positive (although small) and significant relationship between the level of SBA 
lending in a local market and future per capita income growth in that market.  Overall,   11
our empirical results were consistent with a positive impact on social welfare of SBA 
guaranteed lending. 
  In this paper we use a simplified version of the analysis in Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2006) to evaluate a potential determinant of economic performance in high-
minority communities.  Specifically, we test whether SBA guaranteed lending to small 
firms has a relatively greater impact on the average level of labor employment in high-
minority local markets.  We find that it does. 
  In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of the economics of small firm 
credit markets.  This discussion focuses on a highly select group of theoretical and 
empirical articles that help explain the severe credit allocation problems caused by 
imperfect information in small firm credit markets.  These articles also provide insight 
into the mechanism that allow a government intervention, such as the SBA guaranteed 
lending program, to result in higher economic performance in high-minority markets. 
 
4.  The economics of small firm credit markets 
The economic justification for any government-sponsored small business lending 
program or loan guarantee program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of the 
private sector to allocate loans efficiently.  Absent such a clearly identified problem with 
private sector lending to small businesses, the SBA’s activities would simply seem a 
wasteful, politically motivated subsidy to this sector of the economy. 
Many economists, most notably Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981), 
contend that private lending institutions may indeed fail to allocate loans efficiently 
because of fundamental information problems in the market for small business loans.     12
These information problems may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and 
constitute the failure of the credit market.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks 
consider both the interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan when 
deciding to make a loan.  But the lack of perfect information in loan markets may cause 
two effects that allow the interest rate itself to affect the riskiness of the bank’s loan 
portfolio.  When the price (here, the interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is 
unlikely that a price will emerge that suits either the available buyers or sellers (that is, no 
price will “clear the market”). The first effect, adverse selection, impedes the ability of 
markets to allocate credit using price by increasing the proportion of high risk borrowers 
in the set of likely borrowers.  The second effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of 
prices to clear lending markets because it influences the ex post actions of borrowers.   
The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having 
different probabilities of repaying their loans.  The expected return to the bank on a loan 
obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to 
identify borrowers who are more likely to repay.  But it is difficult to identify such 
borrowers.  Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so.  The 
interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device.  For 
example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, 
worse risks.  These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they 
perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower.  So, as the interest rate rises, 
the average “riskiness” of those who are willing to borrow increases, and this may 
actually result in lowering the bank’s expected profits from lending.    13
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior 
of the borrower is likely to also change.  For instance, raising the interest rate decreases 
the profitability of projects which succeed.  Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to 
undertake riskier projects – projects with lower probabilities of success but higher 
payoffs when successful.  In other words, the price a firm pays for credit may affect its 
investment decisions.  This is the moral hazard problem. 
As a result of these two effects, a bank’s expected return may increase less for an 
additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain point may actually decrease 
as the interest rate is increased.  Clearly, under these conditions, it is conceivable that the 
demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in equilibrium. Although traditional 
analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied 
borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the interest 
rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this case.  This is because the bank 
would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher interest rate, as such a borrower 
is likely to be a worse risk than the average current borrower.  The expected return on a 
loan to this borrower at the higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected 
return on the loans the bank is currently making.  Hence, there are no competitive forces 
leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that when borrowers are distinguishable, the 
lender may decide to deny credit to an entire group.  This is their classic redlining 
argument.  We expect the likelihood of this type of credit rationing to be higher in high-
minority communities.  Furthermore, because the value of collecting information on 
borrowers may be less in high-minority markets [because of expectations of less   14
aggregate per capita lending], the levels of imperfect information may be higher, in 
equilibrium, in high-minority markets. 
Importance of lending relationships 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) come to a similar conclusion about the possibility of 
banks rationing credit.  But they also suggest that the extent of credit rationing depends 
on the strength of existing customer relationships; the size, stability, and prospects for 
future growth of deposits; and the existence of profitable future lending opportunities.  
That is, loans may be rationed to current and prospective borrowers in accordance with 
the cohesion of the existing relationships along with expectations about the future 
profitability of those relationships.  In our empirical analysis, we use the notion from 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) that differences in the relative size of the bank deposit base 
across markets may provide an indicator of the relative degree of credit rationing in that 
local market. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) extended the theory that relationships are important 
factors in determining credit rationing.  They suggest that the causes of credit rationing, 
adverse selection and moral hazard, may be more prominent when firms are young or 
small.  However, through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender 
with sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm’s affairs so as to lower the cost 
and increase the availability of credit.  These authors also suggest that an important 
dimension of a relationship is its duration.  Conditional on its positive past experience 
with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky.  This should reduce 
its expected cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide funds.     15
Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that in addition to interaction over time, 
relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products.  That is, borrowers 
may obtain more than just loans from a bank.  Borrowers may purchase a variety of 
financial services and also maintain checking and savings accounts with the bank.  These 
added dimensions of a relationship can affect the firm’s borrowing cost in two ways.  
First they increase the precision of the lender’s information about the borrower.  For 
example, the lender can learn about the firm’s sales by monitoring the cash flowing 
through its checking account or by factoring the firm’s accounts receivables.  Second, the 
lender can spread any fixed costs of producing information about the firm over multiple 
products.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that both effects reduce the lender’s costs of 
providing loans and services, and the former effect increases the availability of funds to 
the firm. 
Berger and Udell (1995) also study the importance of relationships in the 
extension of credit to small firms.  They find that small firms with longer banking 
relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other 
small firms.  These effects appear to be both economically and statistically significant.  
According to Berger and Udell, these results suggest that banks accumulate increasing 
amounts of this private information over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship 
and use this information to refine their loan contract terms. 
 
5.  Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs 
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism 
for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior.  By reducing the expected loss   16
associated with a loan default, the guarantee increases the expected return to the lender – 
without increasing the lending rate.  In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could 
simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of 
borrowers.
†   
With the guarantee in place, the lender could profitably extend credit at loan rates 
below what would be dictated by the risk of the average borrower.  The reason for this is 
that the guarantee increases the profitability of the loan by reducing the losses to the bank 
in those instances when the borrower defaults.  To the extent that the loan guarantees 
reduce the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend, external loan guarantees will 
help mitigate the moral hazard problem.  This is because the lower lending rates afforded 
by external guarantees reduce the bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the expected 
return of safe projects vis-à-vis riskier ones. Additionally, lowering the lending rate 
increases the number of low risk borrowers applying for credit which, in turn, increases 
the likelihood that the average risk of firms applying for loans is representative of the 
pool of borrowers. Hence, external loan guarantees also help mitigate the adverse 
selection problem.    Thus, in theory, SBA loan guarantees should reduce the probability 
that a viable minority-owned small business is credit rationed.   
Because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish 
relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit 
rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to 
assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate.  
                                                 
† This is because each loan made would reflect a random draw from the pool of borrowers.  If the bank 
made a large number of small loans to borrowers in the pool then the bank’s loan portfolio would have the 
same risk and return characteristics of the pool of borrowers.     17
However, the nature of intervention must be carefully evaluated.  SBA’s guaranteed 
lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as they serve as a substitute for 
small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk to the lender of establishing a 
relationship with informationally opaque small business borrowers.  Finally, the SBA 
loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering the risk to 
the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely meet the needs of small 
businesses for capital investment.  It is interesting to note that the problem of long-term 
credit for small businesses was one of the primary reasons stated by Congress for 
establishing the SBA. 
The legislation that created the Small Business Administration was enacted on 
July 30, 1953.
‡  The following year, the SBA began making direct loans and guaranteeing 
bank loans to small businesses.  Congress also assigned to the SBA the function of 
making loans to victims of natural disasters.  This was a continuation of one of the 
functions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an organization dissolved by 
Congress when it created the SBA.  Congress also directed the SBA to continue some of 
the functions of the dissolved Small Defense Plants Administration.  These functions 
included working to get help small businesses procure government contracts; helping 
small business owners with managerial and technical assistance; and assisting small 
businesses develop employee training programs.   
Recognizing that private financial institutions are typically better than 
government agencies at deciding on which small business loans to underwrite, the SBA 
began moving away from making direct loans and toward guaranteeing private loans in 
                                                 
‡ The act that created the SBA is Public Law 163.   18
the early 1970s.  Currently, the SBA makes direct loans only under very special 
circumstances.  Guaranteed lending through the SBA’s 7(a) guaranteed loan program and 
the 504 loan program are the main form of SBA activity in lending markets 
(SBA, 2006). 
The 7(a) loan program is the more basic and more significant of these 
two programs.  The name of the program originates from the section of the Small 
Business Act which authorizes the agency to provide business loans to American small 
businesses [Section 7(a)].   
7(a) loans are available only on a guaranty basis.  This means that they are 
provided by lenders who choose to structure their own loans according to SBA's 
requirements and who apply for and receive a guaranty from SBA on a portion of this 
loan.  The SBA does not fully guaranty 7(a) loans.  The SBA guaranty is usually in the 
range of 50 to 85 percent of the loan amount.  Currently, and the maximum guaranty is 
$1,500,000 and the maximum loan amount under the 7(a) program is $2,000,000.  Thus, 
the maximum guaranty is 75 percent of the maximum loan amount (SBA, 2006).   
The lender and SBA share the risk that a borrower will not be able to repay the 
loan in full. The guaranty is a guaranty against payment default and does not cover other 
contingencies such as imprudent decisions by the lender (such as underpricing of the 
loan, failure to enforce loan covenants, or failure to perfect a lien on collateral) or 
misrepresentation by the borrower (SBA, 2006). 
The 504 loan program is a long-term financing tool for economic development 
within a community.  The 504 program provides growing businesses with long-term, 
fixed-rate financing for major fixed assets, such as land or buildings, through a certified 
   19
development company (CDC).  A CDC is a nonprofit corporation set up to contribute to 
the economic development of its community.  CDCs work with the SBA and private-
sector lenders to provide financing to small businesses.  There are about 270 CDCs 
nationwide.  Each CDC covers a specific geographic area (SBA, 2006).  
Typically, a 504 project includes a loan from a private-sector lender covering up 
to 50 percent of the project cost, a loan from the CDC (backed by a 100 percent SBA-
guaranteed debenture) covering up to 40 percent of the cost, and a contribution of at least 
10 percent equity from the small business being helped.  The SBA-backed loan from the 
CDC is usually subordinate to the private loan, which has the effect of insulating the 
private lender from loss in the event of default (see SBA, 2006 for more on the 504 
program).   
6.  The hypotheses, data, and empirical strategy  
  One method likely to reduce the costs of asymmetric information based credit 
rationing is to reduce the amount of asymmetric information in these credit markets 
[especially for firms in high-minority areas].  One very practical method for doing this is 
to encourage lenders to make [profitable] loans that they would not otherwise make.  
And, in so doing the lender develops a “relationship” with the borrower.  This 
relationship allows for the collection of borrower-specific information at a relatively low 
cost through basic monitoring of the loan.  This reduces future levels of asymmetric 
information and reduces credit rationing by fostering a relationship between the high-
minority area small business and the lending entity.   
  It also encourages the lender to “learn” more about the high-minority area in 
general and increases the likelihood of the lending bank making additional loans in that   20
area.  This is the [positive] information externality effect discussed in Lang and 
Nakamura (1993).  SBA guaranteed lending may increase the level of local bank credit 
available to small firms in high-minority markets by decreasing the amount of firm 
specific asymmetric information in the local financial market and by increasing the 
positive information externality associated with learning about the high-minority area.  
Our empirical research focuses on SBA guaranteed lending because this is where 
the empirical evidence is likely to be strongest concerning the impact of government 
intervention in small firm credit markets.  This conclusion is based on two observations.  
First, SBA guaranteed lending programs encompass all types of small business lenders, 
from community banks and thrifts to bigger banks.  And, second, the SBA guaranteed 
lending programs are relatively large and have operated for a long time—more than a half 
a century. 
We take as our maintained hypothesis that credit market frictions—primarily in 
the form of costly information and verification of a small firm’s projects—can lead to a 
socially suboptimal credit allocation that negatively impacts the labor employment rate in 
the local market. [The implicit assumption here is that labor and capital are complements 
for small firms.]  To the extent that SBA guaranteed lending programs mitigate credit 
market frictions, there should be a positive relationship between SBA guaranteed lending 
and the level of employment, especially across less developed [e.g., high-minority] 
financial markets. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan guarantees lessen credit 
market frictions by testing whether a measure of the normalized amount of SBA 
guaranteed lending in a local market is correlated with relatively higher levels of 
employment in high-minority areas.  Our null hypothesis is that there are no discernible   21
differences in the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in high-
minority markets relative to higher income markets. 
Data 
To examine this SBA guaranteed lending and employment rates in high-minority 
areas hypothesis, we utilize data from three sources.  Our first source is loan-specific 
data—including borrower and lender information—on all SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 
loans from 2 January 1991 through 31 December 1999.  In 2000 the Census Bureau 
reclassified their racial categories.  Because of this change we do not include data after 
1999.  A breakdown of loan size, total credit and number of loans reveals that we have 
over 300,000 loans in our sample.  The average size of these loans was about $225,000, 
suggesting that about $68 billion of credit was extended over our sample period.    
Our second source of data, on economic conditions, is from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) from 1991 through 2001.  Our third source is data from the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s annual summary of deposit data (SUMD) files.   
All of our individual loan data are aggregated to the local market level.  For this 
study, we also aggregate over time to produce cross-sectional observations for our local 
markets.  As in studies by Berger and Hannon (1989), Calem and Carlino (1991), Jackson 
(1992a, 1992b), Shaffer (1994, 2004), and Berger (1995), we use Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) to define the relevant local market for urban areas and non-MSA counties 
as the local market for rural areas.   
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Empirical Strategy 
To test our null hypothesis we simplify the analysis of Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2006).  These authors estimate their models using classic Arellano and Bond 
panel regression estimation techniques.  In this study, we estimate a simple cross-
sectional OLS fixed effects regression model that incorporates measures of employment 
levels over our sample period.  Our basic model is:  
EMPR i = α 0 + α 1 PICAP i + α 2 HERF i + α 3 MSADUM i + α 4 DEPPOP i  
+ α 5 SBAPOP i + α 6 SBADEP i + ε i                         (1) 
Equation (1) uses the average annual employment rate over our sample period (EMPR) at 
the local market level to proxy for economic performance.  We are interested in how 
SBA guaranteed lending affects cross-sectional changes in EMPR.  The primary variables 
of interest on the right side of Equation (1) are DEPPOP (the inflation-adjusted deposits 
per capita in a local market), SBAPOP (the inflation-adjusted total dollar amount of SBA-
guaranteed loans per capita in the local market) and SBADEP.  The variable SBADEP is 
equal to DEPPOP times SBAPOP.  It is a measure of the cross-partial derivative, or 
interaction term, for the impact on EMPR of higher (or lower) amounts of SBA 
guaranteed lending at higher (or lower) levels of inflation-adjusted deposits per capita in 
a local market [DEPPOP].   SBADEP is of interest because it provides an indication of 
whether SBA guaranteed lending has a different impact in less developed local financial 
markets.  For example, a negative coefficient on SBADEP would imply that the impact of 
SBAPOP is less at higher levels of DEPPOP.  Or, stated differently, SBA guaranteed 
lending has less impact in more developed local financial markets.   23
  The analysis described above is used to introduce the general relationship 
between SBA guaranteed lending and local financial market development.  Next, we 
consider the relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and local financial market 
development in high-minority areas.  We use Equation (2) below to conduct this analysis.  
Equation (2) is designed to specifically test whether SBA guaranteed lending has a 
differential impact on local market employment rates in high-minority areas.  Two 
interactive variables are included in Equation (2) to accomplish this test.  The two 
variables are SBAMIN and DEPMIN.   SBAMIN is equal to SBAPOP times HIGHM, and 
DEPMIN is equal to DEPPOP times HIGHM.   And, HIGHM is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the percentage of minority population in the local market is greater than 
25.55 percent; HIGHM is equal to 0.0 percent otherwise.  The value 25.55 percent is 
equal to the mean [10.50] plus one standard deviation [15.05] from the mean for our 
sample.  Equation (2) is as follows. 
 
EMPR i = α 0 + α 1 PICAP i + α 2 HERF i + α 3 MSADUM i + α 4 DEPPOP i +  
α 5 SBAPOP i + α 6 HIGHM i + α 6 DEPMIN + α 6 SBAMIN + ε i                 (2) 
 
Notice that we use a measure of total deposits [DEPPOP] instead of a measure of 
total credit in the local market.  We do this for two reasons.  First, we cannot construct 
measures of bank lending at the local market level.  Market-level deposit data are 
available, however, from the SUMD data.  And, total deposits should be highly correlated 
with lending.  Additionally, using total local market deposits as an instrument for 
approximating cross-sectional differences in the level of total market lending is consistent   24
with previous research such as Peterson and Rajan (1995).  Second, King and Levine 
(1993a) suggest that the local market deposit base is one of several reasonable measures 
of market liquidity and financial development.  
  The deposit market Herfindahl index (HERF) is included in Equations (1) and (2) 
to control for the structure of the local market.  Constructed at the market level using 
branch level deposit data from the SUMD database, HERF provides a measure of 
concentration, and presumably the competitiveness, of the local banking market.  The 
definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Exhibit 1.   
7.  The empirical results 
  Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using a simple OLS fixed effects method.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression can be found in table 1, and 
a correlation coefficients matrix in table 2.  Our regression estimation results are 
presented in table 3.  Notice from table 1 that our primary variables of interest display 
large dispersions.  EMPR, our employment rate percentage, ranges from 98.67 percent to 
a low of 68.06 percent, with a mean of 93.67 percent.   
  Our per capita income variable (PICAP) has a mean of $15,562 with a high of 
$36,772 and a low of $6,637 and a standard deviation of $3,080.  Our measure of 
financial market development, local market deposits per capita (DEPPOP), displays a 
very wide range also.  The high for DEPPOP is $106,313 deposits per capita, while the 
low is only $147 worth of deposits per capita, and the mean is $8,314 per capita.  A 
similar story can be told for our measure of SBA guaranteed lending activity.  Per capita 
SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP) ranges from a high of $416.39 per capita to a low of 
$0.00 per capita, with a mean of $28.33 per capita over our sample period.   25
  In table 2 we present a correlation matrix for our main variables.  There are 
several correlation coefficients in table 2 worth mentioning.  For example, notice that the 
local market employment rate (EMPR) is significantly positively correlated with local 
market per capital income (PICAP), per capita deposits (DEPPOP), and SBA guaranteed 
lending per capita (SBAPOP).  And, that the correlation coefficients for the first two of 
these relationships are rather large.  Also, notice that EMPR is significantly negatively 
correlated with our high-minority population percentage variable (HIGHM) and HERF.   
  The correlation coefficients for our independent variables suggest that 
multicollinearity may be a concern for the relationships between local market per capita 
income (PICAP) and MSADUM, HERF, and DEPPOP.  These and other concerns about 
multicollinearity are evaluated using a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) method.   
  In table 3 we present the main results for our study.  These results are estimated 
using an OLS fixed effects method.  The fixed effects class variable is the state in which 
the local market is located.  Focusing on individual states as our fixed effect allows us to 
control for variations in state specific factors associated with systematic influences on 
employment levels within the same state.  Examples of these state specific factors are 
levels of educational attainment and other human capital measures, technological 
endowment and advancement, and state level public policies designed to influence 
employment rates.   
  From table 3, our measure of financial development (DEPPOP) has a positive and 
significant coefficient, suggesting a positive and significant impact on EMPR.  Recall that 
DEPPOP is per capita bank deposits in the local market.  To some extent this is a 
measure of cross-sectional local market liquidity levels.  A similar measure of liquidity   26
was used by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) to proxy for the level of financial 
development across countries.  The issue of endogeneity is a concern for this variable.  
For it could be argued that higher levels of employment cause higher levels of per capita 
bank deposits as forcefully as it can be argued that higher levels of per capita bank 
deposits cause higher levels of employment.  However, as mentioned in our introduction, 
recent studies such as Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), all report significant evidence supporting the 
proposition that the causal relationship runs from more financial market development to 
better economic performance.  Furthermore, this issue of endogeneity is not central to our 
analysis, as we are more concerned with the impact of our interaction variable SBAMIN 
on EMPR rather than the causal linkages between EMPR and SBAPOP [or between 
EMPR and DEPPOP]. 
  Notice from table 3, that SBAPOP also has a positive and significant coefficient, 
suggesting a positive and significant impact on EMPR.  But, the impact appears to be 
economically small.  For example, if you increased per capita SBA guaranteed lending in 
a local market by three standard deviations (approximately $100) the predicted result is 
an increase in the level of employment by 0.8 percentage points.  Of course, the outcome 
of this example would change to about 1.5 percentage points if we use Model 2 in table 3. 
  The major variable of interest in model 2 of table 3 is SBADEP.  This is the 
interactive variable that represents the impact on EMPR of increasing SBAPOP at higher 
levels of financial market development (DEPPOP). 
 Notice  that  SBADEP has a negative and significant coefficient associated with it.  
This suggests that at higher levels of financial market development (DEPPOP), per   27
capita SBA guaranteed lending has a lower impact on EMPR than it does at lower levels 
of financial market development.  Given that high-minority areas are likely characterized 
by relatively lower levels of financial market development, it is possible that SBA 
guaranteed lending will have more of an impact on local market employment rates in 
high-minority markets.   
  This latter proposition is tested directly in Model 3 of table 3.  The interaction 
variable (SBAMIN) in Model 3 in table 3 is equal to the dummy variable (HIGHM) times 
local market per capita SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP).  The dummy variable 
HIGHM is equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market minority population is greater 
than 25.55 percent.  Notice that the coefficient (-0.47) for HIGHM in table 3 is negative, 
large, and statistically significant.  This suggests that, other things equal, high-minority 
local markets experience an employment rate that is on average 0.47 percentage points 
less than the employment rate for those markets that are not high-minority.     
  Our main variable of interest in model 3 is SBAMIN.  Notice that the coefficient 
[0.012] for SBAMIN is positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level.  Also 
notice that for this specification the coefficient [0.006] for SBAPOP is only about one-
half the size of the coefficient for SBAMIN.  This suggests that SBAPOP has about three 
times the positive impact in high-minority markets as it does in low minority markets.  
Recall that the coefficient on SBAMIN is the marginal impact of SBAPOP in a high-
minority market, the total impact is represented by the sum of the coefficients [0.018] for 
SBAMIN and SBAPOP in model 3.   
  Overall, the results from table 3 suggest that per capita SBA guaranteed lending is 
significantly positively correlated with the local market employment rate.  And, the   28
impact of SBA guaranteed lending on the level of employment is 200 percent greater in 
high-minority markets relative to low minority markets.  These results lead to the 
rejection of our null hypothesis.  Recall that our null hypothesis is that the impact of SBA 
guaranteed lending on employment rates in high-minority markets is the same as it is in 
low minority markets. 
  Our results are also consistent with the notion that less developed financial 
markets benefit relatively more from governmental interventions in small firm credit 
markets.  This relatively higher benefit is consistent with a credit rationing argument such 
as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where the intervention serves to ameliorate a market failure 
in the small firm credit market.  More specifically, the results also suggest that SBA 
guaranteed lending will have a larger positive impact on social welfare if it is targeted to 
certain high-minority areas.       
Robustness Checks 
 Several  robustness  checks  were performed for Equations (1) and (2).  In 
particular, we estimated Equations (1) and (2) separately for MSAs and non-MSA 
counties, using disaggregated guaranteed lending variables for the 7(a) and 504 lending 
programs.  Additionally, we estimated the equations using a stacked regression (OLS) 
approach with our panel data. 
  These robustness checks yield results qualitatively consistent with those reported 
in table 3.  Additionally, because of the potential for multicollinearity in our regressors, 
we conducted a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) analysis.  Our VIF results suggest that 
multicollinearity was not a problem for the results reported in table 3.  We also tested the   29
standard errors in our regressions for possible heteroskedasticity.  This was not a 
significant problem. 
  We recognize that there may some endogeneity concerns with certain variables in 
our models.  For example, higher local market employment rate levels may influence 
local market per capita income as well as vice versa.  We addressed this issue in two 
ways.  First, we removed the per capita income variable from our analysis.  This did not 
materially change our results for our SBA guaranteed lending variable.  Second, we used 
per capita income before the beginning of our sample period (e.g., 1990) in the analysis.  
This latter analysis suggested that local markets with higher per capita income at the 
beginning of the sample period experienced higher levels of employment over the sample 
period.  This provides “some” evidence that higher per capita income levels may result in 
higher levels of employment.  Next, we use the average SBA lending per capita variable 
for the 1991-1995 period and the employment levels variable from the 1996-2001 period.  
All other variables (in model 1 of table 3) were calculated as before.  The results from 
this lagged SBA variable exercise were qualitatively the same as our previous results.  
We also used a stacked regression analysis and lagged the SBA lending variable by one 
period (and two periods).  The results were again qualitatively the same. 
 
7.  Conclusions and extensions to our analysis 
SBA guaranteed lending programs are one of many government sponsored market 
interventions aimed at promoting small business.  The rationale for these guarantees is 
often based on the argument that credit market imperfections can result in small 
enterprises being credit rationed—particularly those in high-minority areas.  If SBA loan   30
guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in high-minority markets for small business 
loans, then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending 
activities and economic performance, and this relationship should be more evident in 
high-minority markets.   
  We find evidence consistent with this proposition in this study.  In 
particular, we find a positive and significant impact on the average annual level of 
employment in a local market as we increase the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that 
local market.  And, the magnitude of this impact is relatively larger in high-minority 
markets.  Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that the impact is three times as large 
in high-minority markets.    
  However, all of our results should be interpreted with caution because of at least 
five issues.  First, we are unable to control for small business lending at the local market 
level and hence, we do not know whether SBA loan guarantees are contributing to 
economic performance by helping to complete the market or are simply proxying for 
small business lending in the market.  Second, we are not able to test whether SBA loan 
guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending in a market – a 
question that is related to who captures the subsidy associated with SBA loan guarantees. 
  Third, we do not have direct measures of whether SBA guaranteed lending is 
really reducing discrimination at the microeconomic level.  Fourth, we do not have any 
measures of the actual demand for credit by potential and existing minority small 
business owners in the local market.  And, fifth, we do not include measures of the costs 
of SBA guaranteed lending...which would include the performance of granted SBA loans.   31
 All of these issues relate to a larger question.  That question is: What is the optimal level 
of SBA guaranteed lending in U.S. small firm credit markets.  Future research will seek 
to shed additional light on this larger question.   32
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Exhibit 1:  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
EMPR  Average employment percentage rate in the local market over the sample period  BLS 
SBAPOP  Average per capita amount of new SBA Guaranteed Lending in the local market over the sample period  SBA, BLS 
HERF  Average deposit market herfindahl over the sample period  FDIC SUMD 
PICAP  Average per capita income in the local market over our sample period  BEA 
MSADUM  Indicator variable equal to one if local market is an MSA, zero otherwise  BEA 
DEPPOP  Average annual per capita bank deposits in the local market over the sample period  FDIC SUMD 
SBADEP  Interactive variable equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP  --- 
HIGHM  Indicator variable equal to one if the minority population in the local market is greater than 25.55 percent  
of the total local market population; zero otherwise.  BLS 
DEPMIN  Interactive variable equal to HIGHM times DEPPOP  --- 
SBAMIN  Interactive variable equal to HIGHM times SBAPOP   --- 
Notes:  SBA -- Small Business administration, FDIC SUMD -- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Summary of Deposit Data, BEA -- Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
BLS -- Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (N=2358) 
 
Variable Mean  Min  Max  Std  Dev 
EMPR 93.67 68.06 98.67  3.00 
HERF 0.53 0.03 1.00 0.28 
PICAP  ($000)  15.562 6.637 36.772 3.080 
MSADUM 0.13  0  1.00  0.34 
DEPPOP($000)  8.314  0.147 106.313 6.114 
SBAPOP($) 28.33  0.00  416.39  29.48 
Minority 10.50  0.00  86.79  15.05 
HIGHM  0.15 0.00 1.00 0.36 
 
 
Notes: EMPR is the average annual employment rate in percentage points over the sample period.  
HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in market i over the 
sample period.  PICAP is average per capita income in local market i over our sample period.  
MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if market i is a MSA 
(metropolitan statistical area).  DEPPOP is the average annual per capita bank deposits in market 
i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA guaranteed lending in market i over our 
sample period.  SBAPOP is calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP is calibrated in 
thousands of dollars per capita. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars.  Minority is the percentage 
of the local market population classified as racial minorities.  HIGHM is an indicator variable 
equal to one if Minority is greater than 25.55; else HIGHM is equal to zero. 
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Table 2.  Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix   
  (N=2358) 
 
 
 EMPR  PICAP  HERF  MSADUM DEPPOP  SBAPOP HIGHM 
EMPR  --- 
 
         
PICAP  0.44 
(0.00) 
---        




---       






---    








---    





























Notes: P-values are in parentheses.  EMPR is the average annual employment rate in percentage 
points over the sample period.  HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between 
zero and one, in market i over the sample period.  PICAP is average per capita income in local 
market i over our sample period.  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero 
otherwise] if market i is a MSA (metropolitan statistical area).  DEPPOP is the average annual 
per capita bank deposits in market i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA 
guaranteed lending in market i over our sample period.  And, SBADEP is an interaction variable 
equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP.  SBAPOP is calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP 
is calibrated in thousands of dollars per capita. HIGHM is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
minority population in the local market is greater than 25.55 percent of the total local market 
population; else HIGHM is equal to zero. 
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Table 3.  OLS Fixed Effects Regression Estimation (N=2358) 
 
This table provides parameter estimates for Equation (1): EMPRi = α0 + α1PICAPi + α2HERFi + α3 
MSADUMi + α4 DEPPOPi + α5 SBAPOPi + α6 SBADEPi + εi.  EMPR is the average annual employment 
rate in percentage points over the sample period.  PICAP is average per capita income in local market i 
over our sample period.  HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in 
market i over the sample period.  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if market 
i is a MSA (metropolitan statistical area).  DEPPOP is the average annual per capita bank deposits in 
market i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA guaranteed lending in market i over our 
sample period.  And, SBADEP is an interaction variable equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP.  SBAPOP is 
calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP is calibrated in thousands of dollars per capita.  This table 
also provides three variations of Equation (1).  In the first variation (Model 1), the variable SBADEP is 
excluded.  In the second variation (Model 3), the variables SBAMIN and DEPMIN are substituted for 
SBADEP.  SBAMIN and DEPMIN are equal to SBAPOP and DEPPOP times a dummy variable, 
respectively.  That dummy variable [HIGHM] is equal to one; and zero otherwise, if the percentage of 
minority population in the local market is greater than 25.55.  T-statistics are in parentheses. “*” indicates 
significant at the 1% level.  “**”indicates significant at the 5% level.  “***”indicates significant at the 10% 
level.   
 
Parameter Estimates and T-statistics 


































































2  0.236 0.238 0.262 
F-statistic  146.94* 123.59* 105.65* 
 